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Figure 1. World Democratization Trends, 1955-2000. Reproduced from Epstein, Bates, et al. (2006) 
 
 
Figure 2. Reproduced from Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001) “The Colonial Origins 
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Figure 3. Timing of the first period of stage game. The part of the tree with a short-horizon government is not 
depicted. 
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Figure 4. Histogram of Polity variable, 1982-2003               Figure 5. Histogram of Democracy variable, 1982-2003 
(Polity=Democracy-Autocracy)               Source: Polity IV Project 
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Figure 6. Histogram of Autocracy variable, 1982-2003 
Source: Polity IV Project 
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Figure 7. Variance of expropriation risk, by regime type, 1982-2003             













Figure 8. Variance of growth rate, by regime type. 
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Figure 9. Regression coefficients for collapse effect on risk variables as a function of political regime. Based on the 















Table 1. Negative economic shocks, by region, 1982-2003  
World Bank  region Number of collapses Unconditional  
probability of  
having collapse 
Australia and Oceania 42 .286 
Center, South and East Asia 69 .145 
Eastern Europe/Former USSR 89 .211 
Latin America 184 .226 
North Africa/Middle East 115 .258 
Sub-Saharian Africa 287 .262 
Western Europe/North America 75 .140 
Total 861 .219 
Source: WDI 2005, authors’ calculations 
 
Table 2. Average growth variables for economic shocks, by region, 1982-2003 
WB Region Average growth before Average growth after Average growth change 
Australia and Oceania 4.746 -3.653 -8.399 
Center, South and East Asia 3.793 -2.308 -6.101 
Eastern Europe/Former USSR -.962 -9.524 -8.562 
Latin America 2.797 -3.577 -6.374 
North Africa/Middle East 3.316 -4.133 -7.449 
Sub-Saharian Africa 2.169 -5.404 -7.573 
Western Europe/North America 2.970 -.4362 -3.406 
Total 2.458 -4.503 -6.962 
Source: WDI 2005, authors’ calculations 
 
Table 3. Natural disasters counted for disaster variable 
Disaster type Occurrence, 1980-2003
Earthquake 590 
Drought 496 




Wave / Surge 15 
Wind Storm 1685 





















Table 4. Summary statistics and sources of data 
Variable         Source Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expropriation risk IRIS-3 1945 2.91 2.309 0 9.5 
Risk of repudiation of 
contracts 
IRIS-3 1945 3.57 2.343 0 9.5 
Economic risk ICRG 2440 67.50 7.695 50.5 97.5 
Financial risk ICRG 2440 67.69 9.638 50 96 
Government stability ICRG 2453 7.31 2.453 0 12 
Polity Polity IV 3688 0.74 7.592 -10 10 
Autocracy dummy Polity IV, 
calculations 
3230 0.35 0.478 0 1 
Intermediate regime dummy Polity IV, 
calculations 
3230 0.28 0.450 0 1 
Democracy dummy Polity IV, 
calculations 
3230 0.37 0.482 0 1 
Collapse dummy WDI 2005,  
calculations 
4179 0.22 0.416 0 1 
Collapse in previous 3 years WDI 2005 , 
calculations 
4186 0.55 0.497 0 1 
Natural disasters EM-DAT, 
calculations 
5643 1.00 2.401 0 33 




5137 2.99 6.802 0 93 




5643 0.07 0.263 0 1 
Negative term of trade shocks 
in previous 3 years 
Rodrik (1999), 
calculations 
5137 0.25 0.572 0 3 
Log (GDP per capita) WDI 2005 3924 8.20 1.135 5.63 11.08 
Openness WDI 2005 3387 79.92 45.546 1.53 296.38 
Log (Population) WDI 2005 5049 15.20 2.086 9.89 20.97 




5643 1.00 2.025 0 17.42 
Government change dummy Leadership 
duration 
database, PITF 


























Table 5. Risk variables and economic shocks, FE. 












Economic shock in 4.394 3.77 9.054 18.022 
years t, t-1, or t-2 [2.56]** [2.23]** [2.92]*** [2.51]** 
Log GDP pc, -0.57 -0.921 -1.571 -2.644 
lagged 3 years [5.40]*** [7.89]*** [8.78]*** [7.04]*** 
Openness, -0.002 -0.003 -0.012 -0.016 
lagged 3 years [0.62] [0.89] [2.38]** [1.72]* 
Year -0.225 -0.168 -0.073 0.008 
 [10.11]*** [9.38]*** [2.25]** [0.14] 
Log (Population) 0.064 -0.022 0.084 0.078 
lagged 3 years [0.54] [0.20] [0.46] [0.22] 
Expropriation Risk, 0.211    
lagged 3 years [2.73]***    
Risk of repudiation of   0.151   
contracts, l. 3years  [1.34]   
ICRG Economic Risk,   0.385  
lagged 3 years   [11.89]***  
ICRG Financial  Risk,    0.253 
lagged 3 years    [2.84]*** 
Observations 1170 1170 1666 1666 
Number of countries 116 116 123 123 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets 





























Table 6. Risk variables and economic shocks, with interactions, FE 












Shock*Autocracy 1.087 1.228 2.647 5.294 
 [1.20] [1.47] [0.52] [0.92] 
Shock*Intermediate  2.635 1.707 13.758 14.335 
Regime [2.69]*** [1.87]* [3.20]*** [2.88]*** 
Shock*Democracy -0.695 -0.059 6.627 2.892 
 [0.75] [0.07] [1.21] [0.40] 
Autocracy -0.223 -0.378 3.884 1.549 
 [0.28] [0.53] [0.84] [0.28] 
Intermediate Regime -1.3 -0.479 -2.772 -3.383 
 [2.02]** [0.84] [0.77] [0.74] 
Log GDP pc, -0.165 -0.112 -0.229 0.635 
lagged 3 years [3.13]*** [2.37]** [1.41] [3.02]*** 
Openness, -0.43 -0.556 -4.045 -6.389 
lagged 3 years [0.60] [0.76] [1.41] [1.59] 
Year -0.007 -0.008 -0.015 -0.011 
 [1.68]* [2.17]** [1.20] [0.72] 
Log (Population) -4.288 -4.565 3.815 -33.082 
lagged 3 years [3.89]*** [4.51]*** [1.28] [7.39]*** 
Expropriation Risk, 0.097    
lagged 3 years [2.18]**    
Risk of repudiation of   0.112   
contracts, l. 3years  [2.30]**   
ICRG Economic Risk,   0.042  
lagged 3 years   [0.99]  
ICRG Financial  Risk,    0.161 
lagged 3 years    [2.88]*** 
Observations 1091 1091 1566 1566 
Number of countries 109 109 117 117 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets 






















Lemma 3 (Full version of lemma 2) At t = 2, in a continuation game with the old government, the set of
equilibria is the following:
1. For R > (B +R)(1  pH) :
 If y1 = 0, equilibrium strategies are xH2 = 1, xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow;
 If xH1 = 1, xL1 = 0, and y1 = 1 then xH2 = 1, xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow
constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if pLpH(1 pH) > 1.
2. If (B +R)pL < R < (B +R)(1  pH) :
 If y1 = 0, equilibrium strategies are xH2 = 1, xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow;
 If y1 = 1, xH1 = 1, and xL1 = 0 then xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow
constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if   pLpH
(1 )pL+pH
(1 )pH(1 pH) > 1.
 If y1 = 1, xH1 = 0, and xL1 = 0 then xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow
constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if 1
(1 c1)(1 pH) pL(+(1 )pH) > 1.
3. If (B +R)pL > R :
 If y1 = 0 and xH1 = 1, equilibrium strategies are xH2 = 0, xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not overthrow;
sj0 = overthrow;
 If y1 = 0, xH1 = 0, and xL1 = 1, strategies xH2 = 0, xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 =
overthrow constitute equilibrium in a continuation game only if
c1pL
(c1+(1 c1)pH)(1 )(1 pH) < 1, herec1 = 
1 (1 )(1 pH)+1 ;
 If y1 = 0, xH1 = 0, and xL1 = 0, strategies xH2 = 0, xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 =
overthrow constitute equilibrium in a continuation game only if 1 pL(1 )(1 pH)





 If y1 = 0, xH1 = 1, and xL1 = 0, strategies xH2 = 0, xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 =
overthrow constitute equilibrium in a continuation game only if (1 
c1pL)pL





 If y1 = 0, xH1 = 0, and xL1 = 0, strategies xH2 = 0, xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 =
overthrow constitute equilibrium in a continuation game only if 1
(1 c1)(1 pH) pL(+(1 )pH) > 1; herec1 = +(1 ) pH
+(1 )pL
;
4. For any , if xH1 = 1, xL1 = 0 or 1, and y1 = 1, then s1j1 = s1j0 = not overthrow, xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1
constitute equilibrium in a continuation game;
5. For any , if xH1 = 0, xL1 = 0, and y1 = 1, then xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = sj0 = not overthrow
constitute equilibrium in a continuation game.
6. For any , if xH1 = 0, xL1 = 0, and y1 = 1; then xH2 = 1, xL2 = 1, and sj1 = sj0 = not overthrow
constitute equilibrium in a continuation game if pLpH(1 pH) > 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a subgame at t = 2 if a new government comes to power. For any government
from the pool of possible governments, the prior probability that a government has high competence is , while
the prior probability that a government has a long time horizon is . As we are looking for the equilibrium in
pure strategies, the governments strategy Pr(xj; t = 2) can be written as x2 2 f0; 1g, where  is the type of
the government. This notation refers only to the government with a long time horizon, as all governments with a
short time horizon predate in all states of the world.
The outcome y = 1 is possible if: (1) competence  = H , discount  = , and predation x = 1, (2) competence
 = H , discount  = , and predation x = 0, (3) competence  = H , discount  = 0, and predation x = 1,
(4) competence  = L , discount  = , and predation x = 0. The outcome y = 0 is possible in the following
cases: (1) competence  = H , discount  = , and predation x = 1, (2) competence  = H , discount  = 0, and
predation x = 1, (3) competence  = L , discount  = , and predation x = 0, (4) competence  = L , discount
 = , and predation x = 1, and (5) competence  = L , discount  = 0, and predation x = 1. Probabilities of
these outcomes depend on peoples prior beliefs about the types of a government and on the governments strategy.
Peoples posterior beliefs about the governments competence are computed by Bayesian formula:
c2jy=1 = xH2pH+(1 xH2)+(1 )pHxH2pH+(1 xH2)+(1 )pH+(1 )(1 xL2)pL
c2jy=0 = xH2(1 pH)+(1 )(1 pH)xH2(1 pH)+(1 )(1 pH)+(1 )(1 xL2)(1 pL)+(1 )xL2+(1 )(1 )
Now consider four possible pure strategy proles of a government at t = 2: xH2 = 1; xL2 = 1; xH2 = 1; xL2 = 0;
xH2 = 0; xL2 = 1; xH2 = 0; xL2 = 0. The rest of the proof is organized as follows. First, for each strategy of a
government, we nd peoples best response to this strategy. Second, we check if the original strategy prole of a
government is still a best response to peoples strategy, i.e. if a proposed pair of strategies constitute an equilibrium
in this game.
Note that everywhere it is optimal for people to change the government if their posterior that the government
has high competence is lower than . Similar, it is optimal to keep the government if peoples posterior that the
government has high competence is higher than .
(1) Assume that xH2 = 1; xL2 = 1. Peoples posteriors about the governments competence are c2jy=1 =
pH
pH = 1 > , c2jy=0 = (1 pH)(1 pH)+(1 ) = (1 pH) pH+1 < . Therefore, the optimal response of people to the assumed
governments strategy is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow.
The payo¤s of di¤erent types of the government given the peoples strategy are following. For  = H , the payo¤
from predation is U(H jx = 1) = B+R+ (pH(B +R) + (1  pH)(1  )(B +R)), and the payo¤ from restraint is
U(H jx = 0) = B+(B+R). So, for a high-competent government, predation is protable if R > (1 pH)(B+R).
Similarly, for  = L, the payo¤ from predation is U(Ljx = 1) = B + R + (1   )(B + R), and the payo¤ from
restraint is U(Ljx = 0) = B + (pL(B + R) + (1   pL)(1   )(B + R)). Therefore, a low-competent government
predates if R > pL(B + R): As 1   pH > pL, strategy proles xH2 = 1; xL2 = 1; and sj1 = not overthrow;
sj0 = overthrow constitute equilibrium if R > (1  pH)(B +R).





> , c2jy=0 = (1 pH)(1 pH)+(1 )(1 pL)+(1 )(1 ) = +(1 ) 1 pL1 pH < . There-
fore, the optimal response of people to the assumed governments strategy is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow.
For a high-competent government, predation is protable if R > (1 pH)(B+R). Similarly, a low-competent
government predates if R > pL(B + R): As 1   pH > pL, strategy xL2 = 0 is not optimal for a low-type
government, and for any parameter values xH2 = 1; xL2 = 0 is not the part of an equilibrium.
(3) Assume that xH2 = 0; xL2 = 1. Peoples posteriors about the governments competence are c2jy=1 =
+(1 )pH
+(1 )pH = 1 > , c2jy=0 = (1 )(1 pH)(1 )(1 pH)+1  = +(1 ) 1(1 )(1 pH ) < . Therefore, the optimal
response of people to the assumed governments strategy is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow.
As before, for a high-competent government, predation is protable if R > (1   pH)(B + R). Similarly, for
 = L, predation is optimal if R > pL(B+R): As 1 pH > pL, strategy proles xH2 = 0; xL2 = 1; and sj1 = not
overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute equilibrium if pL(B +R) < R < (1  pH)(B +R).







>  (as   pL < , and, therefore,   pL <  + (1   )  pH),
c2jy=0 = (1 )(1 pH)(1 )(1 pH)+(1 )(1 pL) = +(1 ) 1 pL
(1 )(1 pH )
<  (as 1 > 1 pH , and 1 pL > 1 ). Therefore,
the optimal response of people to the assumed governments strategy is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow.
As before, for a high-competent government, predation is protable if R > (1   pH)(B + R), and for a
low-competent government, the predation is protable if R > pL(B + R): As a result, the strategy proles
xH2 = 0; xL2 = 0; and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute equilibrium if pL(B +R) > R.
Proof of Lemma 2. After the rst period, the peoples posterior beliefs that the government has high competence
depend on the government strategy in the rst period. Similar to the case of a new government in the second period,
these beliefs can be computed by Bayesian updating:
c1jy1=1 = xH1pH+(1 xH1)+(1 )pHxH1pH+(1 xH1)+(1 )pH+(1 )(1 xL1)pL
c1jy1=0 = xH1(1 pH)+(1 )(1 pH)xH1(1 pH)+(1 )(1 pH)+(1 )(1 xL1)(1 pL)+(1 )xL1+(1 )(1 )
For xH1 = 1, xL1 = 1, these beliefs are c1jy1=1 = 1 and c1jy1=0 = (1 pH)(1 pH)+(1 ) < .






For xH1 = 0, xL1 = 1, these beliefs arec1jy1=1 = 1 >  andc1jy1=0 = (1 )(1 pH)(1 )(1 pH)+1  = +(1 ) 1(1 )(1 pH ) <
.
For xH1 = 0, xL1 = 0, these beliefs are c1jy1=1 = +(1 )pH+(1 )pH+(1 )pL = + (1 )pL
+(1 )pH
>  (as   pL
<  + (1   )  pH), and c1jy1=0 = (1 )(1 pH)(1 )(1 pH)+(1 )(1 pL) = +(1 ) 1 pL
(1 )(1 pH )
<  (as 1 > 1   pH , and
1  pL > 1  ).
Now, we look separately at the cases of y = 0 and y = 1 and analyze which equilibria might be supported for
di¤erent strategies of the government in the rst period.
1. Assume that y = 0, xH1 = 1, and xL1 = 1. Here c1jy1=0 = (1 pH)1 pH < , c1jy1=0 = .
 If xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1, the posterior beliefs of people about the governments competence arec2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1(1 pH) c1pH+1 < c1 < . Then the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = not
overthrow; sj0 = overthrow. Therefore, as calculations in the proof of Lemma 1 show, strategies
xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a
continuation game if R > (1  pH)(B +R).
 If xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 0, the posterior beliefs of people about the governments competence arec2jy2=1 =c1c1+(1 c1)c1 pLpH = +(1 ) pLpH (1 pH ) <  and c2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1 c1pL1 pH < c1jy1=0 < . Note thatc2jy2=1 is smaller than  if pLpH(1 pH) > 1, and higher than  if pLpH(1 pH) > 1 < 1. Then the optimal
strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow if pLpH(1 pH) < 1 and s1j1 = s1j0 = overthrow
if pLpH(1 pH) > 1. In both cases, strategy xL2 = 0 is not optimal for a low-type government, and for any
parameter values xH2 = 1; xL2 = 0 is not the part of an equilibrium.
 If xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, the posterior beliefs of people about the governments competence arec2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1(1 c1)(1 pH ) < c1jy1=0 < . Then the optimal strategy of people
is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow. Therefore, as calculations in the proof of Lemma 1 show,
strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium
in a continuation game if pL(B +R) < R < (1  pH)(B +R).
 If xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0, the posterior beliefs of people about the governments competence arec2jy2=1 = c1c1+ (1 c1)c1pLc1+(1 c1)pH = + (1 )c1pL(c1+(1 c1)pH)(1 pH) >  (as pL < 1  pH and c1 < c1 + (1 c1)  pH)
and c2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1 c1pL(1 c1)(1 pH ) < c1jy1=0 < . Then the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = not
overthrow; sj0 = overthrow:Therefore, strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not overthrow;
sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if pL(B +R) > R.





 If xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1, the posterior beliefs of people about the governments competence arec2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1(1 pH) c1pH+1 < c1 < . The optimal strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow;
sj0 = overthrow. Therefore, strategies xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 =
overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if R > (1  pH)(B +R).
 If xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 0, the posterior beliefs of people about the governments competence arec2jy2=1 = c1c1+(1 c1)c1 pLpH = +(1 )c1 pL(1 pL)pH (1 pH ) and c2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1 c1pL1 pH < c1jy1=0 < .
Note that c2jy2=1 is higher than  if c1  pL(1 pL)pH(1 pH) > 1, and lower than  if c1  pL(1 pL)pH(1 pH) < 1. Then
the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow if c1  pL(1 pL)pH(1 pH) > 1 and
s1j1 = s1j0 = overthrow if c1  pL(1 pL)pH(1 pH) < 1. In both cases, strategy xL2 = 0 is not optimal for a
low-type government, and for any parameter values xH2 = 1; xL2 = 0 is not the part of an equilibrium.
 If xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, the posterior beliefs of people about the governments competence arec2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1(1 c1)(1 pH ) < c1jy1=0 < . Then optimal strategy of people is
sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow. Therefore, strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not
overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if pL(B + R) < R <
(1  pH)(B +R).
 If xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0, the posterior beliefs of people about the governments competence arec2jy2=1 =c1c1+ (1 c1)c1pLc1+(1 c1)pH = + (1 )c1pL(1 pL)(c1+(1 c1)pH)(1 pH) >  (as pL(1 pL) < 1 pH andc1 <c1+(1 c1)pH) andc2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1 c1pL(1 c1)(1 pH ) < c1jy1=0 <  (as 1 c1pL > 1 c1). The optimal strategy of people
is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow Therefore, strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not
overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if pL(B +R) > R.
3. Assume that y = 0, xH1 = 0, and xL1 = 1. Here c1jy1=0 = +(1 ) 1
(1 )(1 pH )




 If xH2 = 1 and xL2 = 1 then c2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1(1 pH) c1pH+1 < . Then strategies xH2 = 1, and
xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if
R > (1  pH)(B +R).
 If xH2 = 1 and xL2 = 0, then c2jy2=1 = c1c1+(1 c1)c1 pLpH = + (1 )(1 pH )(1 )c1 pLpH and c2jy2=0 =c1c1+(1 c1) 1 c1pL1 pH < c1jy1=0 < . If c2jy2=1 > , the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow;
sj0 = overthrow and if c2jy2=1 < , the strategy of people is s1j1 = s1j0 = overthrow. In both cases,
xH2 = 1; xL2 = 0 is not the part of an equilibrium.
 If xH2 = 0 and xL2 = 1, then c2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1(1 c1)(1 pH ) < c1jy1=0 < . Then
strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium
in a continuation game if pL(B +R) < R < (1  pH)(B +R).
 If xH2 = 0 and xL2 = 0, then c2jy2=1 = c1c1+ (1 c1)c1pLc1+(1 c1)pH = + (1 )c1pL(c1+(1 c1)pH)(1 )(1 pH ) and c2jy2=0 =c1c1+(1 c1) 1 c1pL(1 c1)(1 pH ) < c1jy1=0 <  (as 1  c1pL > 1  c1). Note that c2jy2=1 is higher than  ifc1pL
(c1+(1 c1)pH)(1 )(1 pH) < 1, and lower than  if c1pL(c1+(1 c1)pH)(1 )(1 pH) > 1. Then the optimal
strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow if
c1pL
(c1+(1 c1)pH)(1 )(1 pH) < 1
and s1j1 = s1j0 = overthrow if c1pL(c1+(1 c1)pH)(1 )(1 pH) > 1. Note that xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0 are not
best responses to s1j1 = s1j0 = overthrow. As a result, strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not




4. Assume that y = 0, xH1 = 0, and xL1 = 0. Here c1jy1=0 = +(1 ) 1 pL
(1 )(1 pH )
< , c1jy1=0 =

+
(1  pH)  (1  )
(1  )(1  pL)
< .
 If xH2 = 1 and xL2 = 1 then c2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1(1 pH) c1pH+1 < . Then strategies xH2 = 1, and
xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if
R > (1  pH)(B +R).
 If xH2 = 1 and xL2 = 0, then c2jy2=1 = c1c1+(1 c1)c1 pLpH = + (1 )(1 pH ) 1 pL(1 ) c1 pLpH and c2jy2=0 =c1c1+(1 c1) 1 c1pL1 pH < c1jy1=0 < . If c2jy2=1 > , the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow;
sj0 = overthrow and if c2jy2=1 < , the strategy of people is s1j1 = s1j0 = overthrow. In both cases,
xH2 = 1; xL2 = 0 is not the part of an equilibrium.
 If xH2 = 0 and xL2 = 1, then c2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1(1 c1)(1 pH ) < c1jy1=0 < . Then
strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium
in a continuation game if pL(B +R) < R < (1  pH)(B +R).
 If xH2 = 0 and xL2 = 0, then c2jy2=1 = c1c1+ (1 c1)c1pLc1+(1 c1)pH = + (1 )c1pL(1 pL)(c1+(1 c1)pH)(1 )(1 pH ) and c2jy2=0 =c1c1+(1 c1) 1 c1pL(1 c1)(1 pH ) < c1jy1=0 <  (as 1 c1pL > 1 c1). Note that c2jy2=1 is higher than  ifc1  pLc1 + (1 c1)  pH 1  pL(1  )  (1  pH) < 1
and lower than  if
c1pLc1+(1 c1)pH 1 pL(1 )(1 pH) > 1. Then the optimal strategy of people is sj1 =
not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow if c1pLc1+(1 c1)pH 1 pL(1 )(1 pH) < 1 and s1j1 = s1j0 = overthrow if
1 pL
(1 )(1 pH)
c1pLc1+(1 c1)pH > 1. Note that xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0 are not best responses to s1j1 = s1j0 =
overthrow. As a result, strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow con-




5. Assume that y = 1, xH1 = 1, and xL1 = 1. Here c1jy1=1 = 1 > , c1jy1=1 = . For any strategy of
the government in the second period, posterior beliefs about the governments competence are c2jy2=1 = 1
and c2jy2=0 = 1. Therefore, the optimal strategy for people is s1j1 = s1j0 = not overthrow, and xH2 = 1,
and xL2 = 1 is the governments optimal response to that. So, the strategies s1j1 = s1j0 = not overthrow,
xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1 constitute equilibrium in a continuation game.
6. Assume that y = 1, xH1 = 1, and xL1 = 0. Herec1jy1=1 = +(1 ) pLpH > ,c1jy1=0 = +(1 ) pHpH+(1 )pL >
.
 If xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1, then c2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1(1 pH)1 c1pH = +(1 ) pLpH (1 pH ) . Note thatc2jy2=0 is higher than  if pLpH(1 pH) < 1, and lower than  if pLpH(1 pH) > 1. Then the optimal strategy
of people is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow if pLpH(1 pH) < 1 and s1j1 = s1j0 = not overthrow
if pLpH(1 pH) > 1. Therefore, strategies xH2 = 1, xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow
constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if R > (1   pH)(B + R) and pLpH(1 pH) > 1, while
strategies xH2 = 1, xL2 = 1, and s1j1 = s1j0 = not overthrow constitute equilibrium if pLpH(1 pH) < 1.





. If c2jy2=0 > , the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = sj0 = not overthrow
and if c2jy2=0 < , the strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow. In both cases,
xH2 = 1; xL2 = 0 is not the part of an equilibrium.
 If xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, then c2jy2=1 = 1 and
c2jy2=0 = c1c1 + (1 c1)  1(1 c1)(1 pH) =

+ (1  )    pLpH
(1 )pL+pH
(1 )pH(1 pH)
If c2jy2=0 > , the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = sj0 = not overthrow and if c2jy2=0 < , the
strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow. If sj1 = sj0 = not overthrow, the strategy
xH2 = 0 and xL2 = 1 is not a best response. Therefore, strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = not
overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if pL(B + R) < R <
(1  pH)(B +R) and   pLpH
(1 )pL+pH
(1 )pH(1 pH) > 1.
 If xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0, then c2jy2=1 = c1c1+ (1 c1)c1pLc1+(1 c1)pH > c1 >  and
c2jy2=0 = c1c1 + (1 c1)  1 c1pL(1 c1)(1 pH) =

+ (1  )  (1 c1pL)pL
(1 c1)(1 pH)pH
Note that c2jy2=0 is higher than  if (1 c1pL)pL(1 c1)(1 pH)pH < 1, and lower than  if (1 c1pL)pL(1 c1)(1 pH)pH .Then the
optimal strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow if (1 c1pL)pL
(1 c1)(1 pH)pH < 1 and s1j1 =
s1j0 = not overthrow if (1 c1pL)pL
(1 c1)(1 pH)pH > 1. Therefore, strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not
overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if pL(B +R) > R and
(1 c1pL)pL
(1 c1)(1 pH)pH < 1.
7. Assume that y = 1, xH1 = 0, and xL1 = 1. Here c1jy1=1 = 1 > , c1jy1=1 = +(1 )pH < . For any
strategy of the government in the second period, posterior beliefs about the governments competence are
c2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = 1. Therefore, the optimal strategy for people is s1j1 = s1j0 = not overthrow, and
xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1 is the governments optimal response to that. So, the strategies s1j1 = s1j0 = not
overthrow, xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1 constitute equilibrium in a continuation game.
8. Assume that y = 1, xH1 = 0, and xL1 = 0. Herec1jy1=1 = + (1 )pL
+(1 )pH




 If xH2 = 1 and xL2 = 1 then c2jy2=1 = 1 and c2jy2=0 = c1(1 pH) c1pH+1 = + (1 )pL
(+(1 )pH )(1 pH )
> .
Then strategies xH2 = 1, and xL2 = 1, and sj1 = sj0 = not overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a
continuation game.
 If xH2 = 1 and xL2 = 0, then c2jy2=1 = c1c1+(1 c1)c1 pLpH > c1 >  and c2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1 c1pL1 pH .
If c2jy2=1 > , the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = sj0 = not overthrow and if c2jy2=1 < , the
strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow. In both cases, xH2 = 1; xL2 = 0 is not the
part of an equilibrium.
 If xH2 = 0 and xL2 = 1, then c2jy2=1 = 1 and
c2jy2=0 = c1c1+(1 c1) 1(1 c1)(1 pH ) = +(1 ) 1(1 c1)(1 pH ) pL(+(1 )pH)
If c2jy2=0 < , the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow and if c2jy2=1 >
, the strategy of people is s1j1 = s1j0 = not overthrow. Then strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 1, and
sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game if pL(B+R) <
R < (1  pH)(B +R) and 1
(1 c1)(1 pH) pL(+(1 )pH) > 1.






. If c2jy2=0 < , the optimal strategy of people is sj1 = not overthrow;
sj0 = overthrow and if c2jy2=1 > , the strategy of people is s1j1 = s1j0 = not overthrow. Therefore,
strategies xH2 = 0, and xL2 = 0, and sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow constitute an equilibrium
in a continuation game if pL(B +R) > R and
(1 c1pL)
(1 c1)(1 pH) pL+(1 )pH > 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider the case of the following equilibrium in a continuation game: after
observing y1 = 0, citizens play s1j1 = not overthrow; s1j0 = overthrow for any governments strategy in the rst
period, while after observing y1 = 1, citizens play s1j1 = s1j0 = not overthrow for any governments strategy in the
rst period. Equilibrium strategies of the government in the second period after y1 = 0 are computed conditional
on . Continuation payo¤s of the government after the rst period depend on its strategy in the rst period and
the realization of policy outcome in the rst period.
Denote Vtype;w;y1 a continuation payo¤for type type after observing y1 following strategy prole w 2 f00; 01; 10; 11g
of governments in the rst period.
We are looking for Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To nd all pure strategy equilibrium, the strategy of each
type of the government should be a best response to the strategy of the other type of the government given beliefs.
Payo¤s of the government are the following:
UH(xH1 = 1; xL1 = 1) = B +R+  (pHVH;11;1 + (1  pH)(1  )VH;11;0)
UL(xH1 = 1; xL1 = 1) = B +R+  (1  )VL;11;0
UH(xH1 = 1; xL1 = 0) = B +R+  (pHVH;10;1 + (1  pH)(1  )VH;10;0)
UL(xH1 = 1; xL1 = 0) = B + (pLVL;10;1 + (1  pL)(1  )VL;10;0
UH(xH1 = 0; xL1 = 1) = B + VH;01;1
UL(xH1 = 0; xL1 = 1) = B +R+  (1  )VL;01;0
UH(xH1 = 0; xL1 = 0) = B + VH;00;1
UL(xH1 = 0; xL1 = 0) = B + (pLVL;00;1 + (1  pL)(1  )VL;00;0
Continuation payo¤s are the following:
VH;11;1 = VH;01;1 = VH;00;1 = (1 + ) [B +R]
VH;11;0 = VH;10;1 = VH;10;0 =
8>>><>>>:
B +R+  (pH + (1  pH)(1  )) [B +R] if R > (1  pH)(B +R)
B +  [B +R] if pL(B +R) < R < (1  pH)(B +R)
B +  [B +R] if R < pL(B +R)
VL;11;0 = VL;10;0 = VL;10;1 = VL;01;0 = VL;00;1 =
=VL;00;0 =
8>>><>>>:
B +R+  (1  ) [B +R] if R > (1  pH)(B +R)
B +R+  (1  ) [B +R] if pL(B +R) < R < (1  pH)(B +R)
B +  (pL + (1  pL)(1  )) [B +R] if R < pL(B +R)
The best response of a high-competent government to xL1 = 1 is xH1 = 1 if
B +R+  (pHVH;11;1 + (1  pH)(1  )VH;11;0) > B + VH;01;1
i.e. if R + (1   pH)(1   )VH;11;0 > (1   pH)VH;11;1. For R < (1   pH)(B + R), this condition is equiv-
















For R > (1  pH)(B +R), condition R+ (1  pH)(1  )VH;11;0 > (1  pH)VH;11;1 is equivalent to R+ (1 
pH)(1 ) (B +R+  (pH + (1  pH)(1  )) [B +R]) > (1 pH)(1+) [B +R], i.e. (1 )22(1 pH)2 [B +R]+
(1  )(1  pH)(B + R)(1 + pH) + R   (1  pH)(1 + ) [B +R] > 0. Taking into account that  is probability
and belongs to [0; 1] interval, the latest condition is equivalent to  > 1   2, where 2 is a positive solution of
equation (1 )2(1 pH)+(1 )(1+ pH)+R=(B+R)(1 pH)  (1+ ) = 0. So, the best response to xL1 = 1










Similarly, the best response of a high-competent government to xL1 = 0 is xH1 = 1 if B + R + (pH + (1  
pH)(1  ))VH;10;0 > B + VH;00;1, i.e. if the same conditions as before are satised.
The best response of a low-competent government to xH1 = 1 is xL1 = 1 if B + R +  (1  )VL;11;0 >
B + (pLVL;10;1 + (1  pL)(1  )VL;10;0, i.e. if R > pLVL;11;0. If R > pL(B +R), this inequality is equivalent
to R > pL (1 +  (1  )) [B +R], which can be rewritten as 2pL2 pL(1+ )+ RB+R > 0: If R is su¢ ciently
large, p2L
2(1 + )2   4 RB+RpL2 < 0; and, as a result, the best response to xH1 = 1 is xL1 = 1. Alternatively,
if R < pL(B + R), xL1 = 1 is a best response if R > pL (B +  (pL + (1  pL)(1  )) [B +R]) : The latter
inequality is equivalent to 2(1   pL)   ( BB+R + ) + RpL(B+R) > 0, which is always satised if R is su¢ ciently
large, i.e. if ( BB+R + )
2   4 RpL(B+R) (1  pL) < 0. Therefore, for a low-competent government, if R is su¢ ciently
large, the best response to xH1 = 1 is xL1 = 1: In contrast, if R is su¢ ciently small, the best response to xH1 = 1
might be xL1 = 0 for su¢ ciently large :
Similarly, the best response of a low competent government to xH1 = 0 is xL1 = 1 if R is su¢ ciently large, and
.xL1 = 0 if R is su¢ ciently small and  is su¢ ciently large.
For people, for all strategy proles except xH1 = 1, xL1 = 0, s1j1 = not overthrow; s1j0 = overthrow is a best
response as a positive outcome increases the ex-post probability of a high-competent government, while a negative
outcome decreases this probability.
As a result, possible equilibria in the rst stage are the following. If R is su¢ ciently large, the equilibrium set
of strategies is xL1 = 1, xH1 = 1; sj1 = not overthrow; sj0 = overthrow if  is su¢ ciently large (i.e.  > 2)
and xL1 = 1, xH1 = 0; s1j1 = not overthrow; s1j0 = overthrow if  is su¢ ciently small. If R is su¢ ciently small,
the equilibrium set of strategies is xL1 = 1, xH1 = 1; s1j1 = not overthrow; s1j0 = overthrow if  is su¢ ciently
large (i.e.  > 2), xL1 = 1, xH1 = 0; s1j1 = not overthrow; s1j0 = overthrow if  is in intermediate range, and
xL1 = 0, xH1 = 0; s1j1 = not overthrow; s1j0 = overthrow if  is su¢ ciently small.
Equilibria in continuation games are described above in lemma2.




< , and c1jy1=0;xH1=0;xL1=0 = +(1 ) 1 pL
(1 )(1 pH )
< . In any case, the risk of predation
goes up, as low-competent government predate more often.
Proof of Proposition 3. For intermediate values of , a low-competent government predates, while a high-
competent government refrains from predation in the second period. The risk of predation, therefore, varies with
c1, the posterior belief about . For high or low values of , both types of government behave in the same way,
both in the rst and in the second period. So, the estimated risk of predation does not change in these cases.
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